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EMOTIONAL COMPELLED DISCLOSURES 
Caroline Mala Corbin∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
There is much that Professor Rebecca Tushnet and I agree on when 
it comes to emotion and compelled speech.1  Most fundamentally, we 
agree that emotion and reason are inextricably linked, and therefore 
government-compelled disclosures that provoke emotional responses 
are not automatically suspect.  Consequently, the D.C. Circuit was 
wrong to strike down mandatory cigarette warnings on the ground 
that they were emotional rather than purely factual.2  We also both 
agree that the government should not be able to compel emotional 
speech, or really any speech, that is factually erroneous or misleading.  
For this reason alone, the government should not be able to require 
disclosures that suggest abortion causes depression or an increased risk 
of suicide, as these claims are patently false.3 
For Tushnet, compelled disclosures, whether they be graphic ciga-
rette warnings depicting the gruesome consequences of smoking or 
abortion counseling detailing the state’s moral view on abortion, are 
fine as long as they are accurate and nonmisleading.4  Her thesis — 
that from a Free Speech Clause perspective, only factually wrong or 
misleading emotional compelled speech is problematic — has the vir-
tue of clarity.  But it also has its limits.  First, it defines deception too 
narrowly and overlooks that you can deceive and mislead with emo-
tion as well as with facts.  Second, if deceptive compelled speech trig-
gers concern because it fails to respect the autonomy of its audience, 
then the government’s goals, and not just its means, merit examina-
tion.  Finally, a complete analysis of compelled disclosures must also 
consider the autonomy of the compelled speaker. 
I.  DECEPTION 
Tushnet rightly condemns deceptive disclosures that are factually 
false or misleading.  I would, however, define deceptive more broadly 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗  Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. 
 1 See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014). 
 2 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 3 See Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 2392, 2415 & n.110 (2014). 
 4 Id. at 2432. 
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to also encompass compelled speech that is, for want of a better 
phrase, emotionally false or misleading.  By that I mean compelled 
disclosures that intentionally exploit certain heuristics, including affect 
heuristics.  A heuristic is a cognitive shortcut.  Because our minds are 
overwhelmed with information, they have developed these shortcuts to 
help process all that information.  While often accurate, heuristics can 
also lead to predictable errors.  For example, one shortcut advertisers 
regularly use is to make you like something not by virtue of its own 
merits, but by associating it with something else that you already like.  
It is the difference between trying to persuade you to buy a toaster 
with a beautiful picture of the toaster, and trying to persuade with a 
picture of a beautiful woman draped over the toaster.  The latter is in-
tentionally taking advantage of a cognitive shortcut.  Just as it is ma-
nipulative to intentionally provide false information (making people 
think positively about the toaster by falsely stating *chefs love this 
toaster*), it is manipulative to intentionally exploit certain cognitive 
shortcuts (making people think positively about the toaster by associat-
ing it with a *sexy woman*).  Both compelled disclosures lead the au-
dience to draw conclusions they would not otherwise have drawn. 
I think most, if perhaps not all, of the tobacco images proposed by 
the FDA fall into the legitimate use of emotion category.  That is, any 
emotional response is due to the merits of the claim, rather than inten-
tional exploitation of an affect heuristic.  You don’t recoil from smok-
ing because it has been associated with something you already view 
negatively and you are transferring these negative emotions onto 
smoking.  Rather, you recoil from smoking because the image of the 
diseased lung or cancerous mouth depicts the actual consequences of 
smoking.  Any negative reaction is not mapped onto smoking from an-
other source, but stems from the smoking itself. 
Tushnet points to my hesitation in finding that all FDA-mandated 
images satisfy this criterion to conclude that this distinction is un-
workable.  It is true that the line-drawing may be difficult.  Neverthe-
less, I am not comfortable having no line at all.  Tushnet believes that 
government mandates are not likely to associate completely unrelated 
things, like the harms of smoking and maggot-infested meat.  I am not 
sure I trust the government that much, especially in the context of 
states’ abortion regulations.  If the government may intentionally ex-
ploit affect heuristics and put images of weeping women or maggot in-
fested meat on cigarette packages, it opens the door to allowing the 
government to force women seeking abortions to look at images of 
weeping women or maggot-infested aborted fetuses.  This deliberate 
exploitation undermines the decisional autonomy at the heart of free 
speech jurisprudence. 
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II.  GOALS OF COMPELLED DISCLOSURES 
If decisional autonomy is what is at stake, then the state’s goals 
should matter.  Tushnet disagrees: Provided the compelled disclosures 
are not deceptive, the government may, for example, equally seek to 
deter abortion as smoking.  As long as the audience can ultimately de-
cide whether to abort or to smoke, their autonomy remains intact. 
I suspect her thesis is again propelled by the problem of line-
drawing.  Without doubt, there are difficult lines to draw.  I even agree 
that some, such as the distinction between compelled disclosures meant 
to inform and those meant to persuade, are impossible.  At the same 
time, I think Tushnet is too quick to reject that autonomy might also 
be implicated by government interference with the decisionmaking 
process as well as the ultimate decision.  After all, decisionmaking is 
not limited to making the final decision but includes choosing what to 
consider in making that decision.  Consequently, I think there are dif-
ferences, and differences that matter in terms of decisional autonomy, 
between the government trying to persuade someone not to smoke be-
cause smoking is harmful and the government trying to persuade 
someone not to have an abortion because abortion is tantamount to 
murder.5 
First, the two goals differ in that one is based on uncontested facts 
and one is based on a contested moral proposition.  Tushnet argues 
that my distinction between controversial and noncontroversial is un-
tenable because in this day and age, everything is contested.6  I disa-
gree that everything is up in the air.  Such an argument is akin to 
claiming there is no difference between truth and falsity because eve-
ryone disputes everything. 
The smoking disclosures attempt to persuade audiences to avoid 
smoking because smoking will make them (and those around them) 
sick.  That smoking is addictive and causes various illnesses is not dis-
puted.  It is a well-established scientifically based fact.  The abortion 
disclosures, on the other hand, attempt to persuade audiences to avoid 
abortion on the grounds that abortion kills an unborn baby.  (Here, I 
have in mind laws like those in South Dakota that require doctors to 
tell women that an abortion will “terminate the life of a whole, sepa-
rate, unique living human being.”7)  This is not uncontested fact.  Ra-
ther, it is a moral if not religious viewpoint over which the country is 
deeply divided. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 Both goals seek to avoid harm, either to oneself or to others.  Where the goals differ is in 
how the government reached the conclusion that the discouraged behavior (smoking or abortion) 
is harmful.   
 6 Tushnet, supra note 3, at 2427. 
 7 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2013). 
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Second, the two goals differ in that one promotes autonomy and 
one potentially undercuts it.  Given that smoking is toxic and addic-
tive, odds are it will enhance your autonomy to eschew it.8  Unlike 
smoking, an abortion can boost a woman’s autonomy.  As Justice 
Ginsburg has explained, the availability of abortion ensures “a wom-
an’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal 
citizenship stature.”9 
Compared to forcing people to take note of undisputed facts, forc-
ing people to listen to the government’s moral/religious views resonates 
differently for autonomy, as does urging a course of action that might 
actually work against the audience’s autonomy.  Furthermore, if avoid-
ing state orthodoxy is a prime free speech goal, then compelled disclo-
sures that have the goal of foisting state orthodoxy onto a captive au-
dience ought to set off free speech alarm bells. 
III.  SPEAKER AUTONOMY 
That the government’s goal is based on controversial moral consid-
erations rather than uncontroversial facts also raises a compelled 
speech issue that Tushnet chose not to address in her paper, which is 
the free speech rights of the compelled speakers.  State-mandated 
speech implicates the individual autonomy of the compelled speaker, 
as the right to control your speech can be violated as much by being 
forced to speak as by being silenced.  And as the Supreme Court em-
phasized in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,10 
which held that the state cannot force students to recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance, and Wooley v. Maynard,11 which held that the state cannot 
force drivers to carry the state’s ideological message on their automo-
biles, the insult to autonomy is greater when the speaker does not 
share the government’s viewpoint. 
The compelled tobacco disclosures do not present this concern.  
There is no risk of infringing upon the individual autonomy of tobacco 
companies because they are corporations, not people.  Forcing people 
to convey the government’s message risks treating them as a means to 
an end and compromising the inherent dignity with which all humans 
are endowed.  Although corporations are sometimes considered legal 
“persons,” they are not, of course, actual people or like actual people.12  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 Granted, a few outliers may enjoy smoking precisely because of its danger, but these excep-
tions do not defeat the general proposition that avoiding addiction is autonomy-enhancing. 
 9 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 10 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 11 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 12 Nor do corporations equal an association of people.  While voluntary associations and their 
members are essentially alter egos, corporations and the people who comprise them are not.  On 
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Corporations are not ends in themselves but instrumental entities — 
legal fictions created to facilitate economic growth.  Nor do corpora-
tions possess an inviolable dignity such that we need to respect their 
autonomy.13  On the other hand, the compelled abortion disclosures, 
which force physicians to convey an ideological if not religious mes-
sage, do violate individual autonomy.  In fact, compelled ideological 
speech is anathema to free speech for precisely this reason. 
CONCLUSION 
Tushnet and I agree that the appeal to emotion in compelled disclo-
sures is not necessarily problematic in and of itself.  We both agree 
that the state should not compel false or misleading speech.  But this 
alone is too modest a proposal.  When the government intentionally 
exploits emotion heuristics, it compromises the audience’s autonomy.  
When it mandates an ideological message, it undermines the autonomy 
of both speaker and audience.  Tushnet’s concerns about line-drawing 
have merit, but do not, in my opinion, warrant granting the govern-
ment an (almost) free pass as to how it conveys its message and what 
goals it may choose. 
Nonetheless, Tushnet’s insistence that we recalibrate our skepticism 
to focus more on deception and less on emotion might have prevented 
one of the most puzzling aspects of these compelled speech cases, 
which is the way the court of appeals decisions transformed the facts 
of smoking into ideology, and the ideology of abortion into facts.  In 
striking the compelled tobacco disclosures, the D.C. Circuit found that 
the emotional disclosures necessarily equated to ideological ones.14  In 
upholding South Dakota’s abortion disclosures about terminating the 
life of a whole, separate, unique living human being, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that because the statute defined “human being” as member of 
the species of homo sapiens, it was a factual statement.15  Different 
conclusions might have obtained had the former court accepted and 
understood emotion more and the latter court tolerated deception and 
manipulation less. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the contrary, the point of incorporation is to create a distinct legal entity so that, for example, the 
owners are not liable for the corporation’s debts. 
 13 The concern with speaker autonomy is particularly misplaced when dealing with corpora-
tion’s commercial speech, which is protected not for the sake of corporations but for the sake of 
audiences: “[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified prin-
cipally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides.”  Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  
 14 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 15 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc).  The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals also upheld disclosures about depression and suicide 
on the (shaky) grounds that they merely referred to correlation rather than causation.  See 
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
